

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, DC 20530

Exhibit A to Registration Statement**Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended**

INSTRUCTIONS. Furnish this exhibit for EACH foreign principal listed in an initial statement and for EACH additional foreign principal acquired subsequently. The filing of this document requires the payment of a filing fee as set forth in Rule (d)(1), 28 C.F.R. § 5.5(d)(1). Compliance is accomplished by filing an electronic Exhibit A form at <https://www.fara.gov>.

Privacy Act Statement. The filing of this document is required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, for the purposes of registration under the Act and public disclosure. Provision of the information requested is mandatory, and failure to provide this information is subject to the penalty and enforcement provisions established in Section 8 of the Act. Every registration statement, short form registration statement, supplemental statement, exhibit, amendment, copy of informational materials or other document or information filed with the Attorney General under this Act is a public record open to public examination, inspection and copying during the posted business hours of the FARA Unit in Washington, DC. Statements are also available online at the FARA Unit's webpage: <https://www.fara.gov>. One copy of every such document, other than informational materials, is automatically provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act, and copies of any and all documents are routinely made available to other agencies, departments and Congress pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Act. The Attorney General also transmits a semi-annual report to Congress on the administration of the Act which lists the names of all agents registered under the Act and the foreign principals they represent. This report is available to the public in print and online at: <https://www.fara.gov>.

Public Reporting Burden. Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average .22 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Chief, FARA Unit, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530; and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

1. Name of Registrant Center for International Policy	2. Registration Number 6896
--	--------------------------------

3. Primary Address of Registrant 2000 M Street, NW, Suite 720, Washington, DC 20036
--

4. Name of Foreign Principal Korea Foundation	5. Address of Foreign Principal 55, Sinjung-ro Seogwip-si, Jeju-do KOREA, SOUTH 63565
--	--

6. Country/Region Represented KOREA, SOUTH

7. Indicate whether the foreign principal is one of the following: <input type="checkbox"/> Government of a foreign country ¹ <input type="checkbox"/> Foreign political party <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Foreign or domestic organization: If either, check one of the following: <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Partnership <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Corporation <input type="checkbox"/> Association </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Committee <input type="checkbox"/> Voluntary group <input type="checkbox"/> Other (<i>specify</i>) _____ </div> </div> <input type="checkbox"/> Individual-State nationality _____
--

8. If the foreign principal is a foreign government, state: a) Branch or agency represented by the registrant b) Name and title of official with whom registrant engages
--

¹ "Government of a foreign country," as defined in Section 1(e) of the Act, includes any person or group of persons exercising sovereign de facto or de jure political jurisdiction over any country, other than the United States, or over any part of such country, and includes any subdivision of any such group and any group or agency to which such sovereign de facto or de jure authority or functions are directly or indirectly delegated. Such term shall include any faction or body of insurgents within a country assuming to exercise governmental authority whether such faction or body of insurgents has or has not been recognized by the United States.

9. If the foreign principal is a foreign political party, state:

- a) Name and title of official with whom registrant engages

- b) Aim, mission or objective of foreign political party

10. If the foreign principal is not a foreign government or a foreign political party:

- a) State the nature of the business or activity of this foreign principal.

See Appendix for Response

- b) Is this foreign principal:

Supervised by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Owned by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Directed by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Controlled by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
Financed by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
Subsidized in part by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>

11. Explain fully all items answered "Yes" in Item 10(b).

Item 10(b)(4): Chair and Directors are appointed by South Korea's Foreign Minister.

Item 10(b)(5): Corporation is funded in part with funds from the South Korean Foreign Ministry.

Item 10(b)(6): See above

12. If the foreign principal is an organization and is not owned or controlled by a foreign government, foreign political party or other foreign principal, state who owns and controls it.

EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and subject to the penalties of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 22 U.S.C. § 618, the undersigned swears or affirms under penalty of perjury that he/she has read the information set forth in this statement filed pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, that he/she is familiar with the contents thereof, and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her knowledge and belief.

Date

Printed Name

Signature

11/13/2020Richard Eisenberg/s/Richard Eisenberg

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and subject to the penalties of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 22 U.S.C. § 618, the undersigned swears or affirms under penalty of perjury that he/she has read the information set forth in this statement filed pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, that he/she is familiar with the contents thereof, and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her knowledge and belief.


Date

Printed Name

Signature

11/13/2020

Richard Eisenberg



Appendix

Response to Item 10(b)

The mission of The Korea Foundation is to promote better understanding of Korea within the international community and to increase friendship and goodwill between Korea and the rest of the world through various exchange programs.

Main Activities

- Organizes, supports and participates in various events aimed at fostering international exchange.
- Dispatches and invites specialists committed to international exchange.
- Supports overseas research on Korea and distributes the results of such research.
- Engages in various activities aimed at promoting knowledge and understanding of Korea within the international community.
- Increases friendship and goodwill between Korea and the rest of the world via exchange and cooperation with major overseas international exchange organizations.
- Supports activities by overseas Korean organizations to improve the status of Korea in the international community and to promote national solidarity.
- Organizes and engages in various programs required to achieve the mission and goals of the Foundation

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, DC 20530

Exhibit B to Registration Statement**Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended**

INSTRUCTIONS. A registrant must furnish as an Exhibit B copies of each written agreement and the terms and conditions of each oral agreement with his foreign principal, including all modifications of such agreements, or, where no contract exists, a full statement of all the circumstances by reason of which the registrant is acting as an agent of a foreign principal. Compliance is accomplished by filing an electronic Exhibit B form at <https://www.fara.gov>.

Privacy Act Statement. The filing of this document is required for the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, for the purposes of registration under the Act and public disclosure. Provision of the information requested is mandatory, and failure to provide the information is subject to the penalty and enforcement provisions established in Section 8 of the Act. Every registration statement, short form registration statement, supplemental statement, exhibit, amendment, copy of informational materials or other document or information filed with the Attorney General under this Act is a public record open to public examination, inspection and copying during the posted business hours of the FARA Unit in Washington, DC. Statements are also available online at the FARA Unit's webpage: <https://www.fara.gov>. One copy of every such document, other than informational materials, is automatically provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act, and copies of any and all documents are routinely made available to other agencies, departments and Congress pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Act. The Attorney General also transmits a semi-annual report to Congress on the administration of the Act which lists the names of all agents registered under the Act and the foreign principals they represent. This report is available to the public in print and online at: <https://www.fara.gov>.

Public Reporting Burden. Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average .32 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Chief, FARA Unit, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530; and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

1. Name of Registrant
Center for International Policy

2. Registration Number
6896

3. Name of Foreign Principal
Korea Foundation

Check Appropriate Box:

4. ☒ The agreement between the registrant and the above-named foreign principal is a formal written contract. If this box is checked, attach a copy of the contract to this exhibit.
5. ☐ There is no formal written contract between the registrant and the foreign principal. The agreement with the above-named foreign principal has resulted from an exchange of correspondence. If this box is checked, attach a copy of all pertinent correspondence, including a copy of any initial proposal which has been adopted by reference in such correspondence.
6. ☐ The agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal is the result of neither a formal written contract nor an exchange of correspondence between the parties. If this box is checked, give a complete description below of the terms and conditions of the oral agreement or understanding, its duration, the fees and expenses, if any, to be received.
7. What is the date of the contract or agreement with the foreign principal? 10/01/2020
8. Describe fully the nature and method of performance of the above indicated agreement or understanding.

See Appendix for Response

9. Describe fully the activities the registrant engages in or proposes to engage in on behalf of the above foreign principal.

Please see attached proposal for details about the planned activities.

10. Will the activities on behalf of the above foreign principal include political activities as defined in Section 1(o) of the Act¹.

Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, describe all such political activities indicating, among other things, the relations, interests or policies to be influenced together with the means to be employed to achieve this purpose. The response must include, but not be limited to, activities involving lobbying, promotion, perception management, public relations, economic development, and preparation and dissemination of informational materials.

See Appendix for Response

11. Prior to the date of registration² for this foreign principal has the registrant engaged in any registrable activities, such as political activities, for this foreign principal?

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, describe in full detail all such activities. The response should include, among other things, the relations, interests, and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored, or delivered speeches, lectures, social media, internet postings, or media broadcasts, give details as to dates, places of delivery, names of speakers, and subject matter. The response must also include, but not be limited to, activities involving lobbying, promotion, perception management, public relations, economic development, and preparation and dissemination of informational materials.

Set forth below a general description of the registrant's activities, including political activities.

Set forth below in the required detail the registrant's political activities.

Date	Contact	Method	Purpose
------	---------	--------	---------

12. During the period beginning 60 days prior to the obligation to register³ for this foreign principal, has the registrant received from the foreign principal, or from any other source, for or in the interests of the foreign principal, any contributions, income, money, or thing of value either as compensation, or for disbursement, or otherwise?

Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, set forth below in the required detail an account of such monies or things of value.

Date Received	From Whom	Purpose	Amount/Thing of Value
09/21/2020	Korea Foundation	Grant payment	\$ 30,000.00

\$ 30,000.00

13. During the period beginning 60 days prior to the obligation to register⁴ for this foreign principal, has the registrant disbursed or expended monies in connection with activity on behalf of the foreign principal or transmitted monies to the foreign principal?

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any.

Date	Recipient	Purpose	Amount
------	-----------	---------	--------

¹ "Political activity," as defined in Section 1(o) of the Act, means any activity which the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party

^{2,3,4} Pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Act, an agent must register within ten days of becoming an agent, and before acting as such

EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and subject to the penalties of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 22 U.S.C. § 618, the undersigned swears or affirms under penalty of perjury that he/she has read the information set forth in this statement filed pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, that he/she is familiar with the contents thereof, and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her knowledge and belief.

Date

Printed Name

Signature

11/13/2020

Richard Eisenberg


/s/Richard Eisenberg

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and subject to the penalties of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 22 U.S.C. § 618, the undersigned swears or affirms under penalty of perjury that he/she has read the information set forth in this statement filed pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, that he/she is familiar with the contents thereof, and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her knowledge and belief.

Date

Printed Name

Signature

11/13/2020	Richard Eisenberg	
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

Appendix

Response to Item 8

Item 8: Describe fully the nature and method of performance of the above indicated agreement or understanding.

Just Coexistence: Resolving the Korean Security Crisis Through Sovereign Equality --
CIP will conduct an eleven-month study to identify a middle ground for all three conflict dimensions in Korea - the Korean War, the Korean Peninsula in Sino-American rivalry, and nuclear weapons - based on legal dimensions of the authority and concrete relevance of specific legal principles. Short-term and long-term solutions tailored to the Korean context will be proposed based on results. Resulting articles will be published to make research accessible to the public and to researchers at various platforms including The National Interest and CIP, and mainstream commentary magazines such as The Atlantic and The New Republic.

Please see attached proposal for more details about the planned activities.

Appendix

Response to Item 10

Item 10: Will the activities on behalf of the above foreign principal include political activities as defined in Section 1(o) of the Act. If yes, describe all such political activities indicating, among other things, the relations, interests or policies to be influenced together with the means to be employed to achieve this purpose. The response must include, but not be limited to, activities involving lobbying, promotion, perception management, public relations, economic development, and preparation and dissemination of informational materials.

While Center for International Policy does not believe that its activities will include "political activities" as defined in Section 1(o) of the Act, out of an abundance of caution we have responded affirmatively to this question in light of recent opinions from the FARA office suggesting that the office does view such activities as falling within the definition.

Such activities consist of publications of public-facing activities to disseminate the results of research to contribute to the policy debate on the resolution of the Korean security crisis through diverse formats addressing a variety of audiences. This will include:

- A series of six articles in a high-impact foreign publication to which I regularly contribute, The National Interest.
- Explaining the lessons in layman's terms in two articles for mainstream commentary magazines, such as the Atlantic, the New Republic or the American Conservative.
- Developing the research findings into a report with all the technical analysis and references required for a specialized policymaker audience, and will publicize the report through launch events in Washington D.C., at the Center for International Policy, and New York, prospectively at the Korea Society or the Columbia Law School Center for Korean Legal Studies, as well as using the report to inform advising of international and national groups advocating for peace in Korea.

More information is available in the attached proposal.

Grant Agreement

THIS GRANT AGREEMENT (this “**Agreement**”) is made between the Korea Foundation, whose registered address is 55, Sinjung-ro, Seogwip-si, Jeju-do 63565, Republic of Korea, (the “**KF**”) and the Center for International Policy, whose registered address is 2000 M Street NW, Suite 720, Washington DC 20036, United States of America (the “**Center**”) (collectively, the KF and the Center are referred to as the “**Parties**”).

WHEREAS, the KF agrees to award the Center a grant of thirty thousand U.S. dollars (US\$30,000) (the “**Grant**”) to support the Center’s project titled “*Just Coexistence: Resolving the Korean Security Crisis Through Sovereign Equality*” (the “**Project**”), which is based on the plan submitted by the Center to the KF on August 30, 2020 (the “**Plan**”).

NOW, THEREFORE, the Parties agree to abide by the following terms and conditions:

1. Terms of Agreement

This Agreement is effective for twelve (12) months from October 1, 2020 until September 30, 2021 (the “**Grant Period**”), unless adjusted or renewed in writing by mutual consent of the Parties.

The Grant Period consists of eleven (11) months of the project period (the “**Project Period**”) and one (1) month of the final reporting period. The Project shall be conducted during the Project Period from October 1, 2020 until August 31, 2021, and the Center shall report the results of the Project to the KF during the final month of the Grant Period (September 2021) pursuant to Article 8-B of this Agreement.

2. Implementation of the Project

2-A. The Center shall implement all the research activities of the plan in a professional and timely manner, completing the following:

(1) Just Coexistence: Resolving the Korean Security Crisis Through Sovereign Equality

The Center will conduct an eleven-month study to identify a middle ground for all three conflict dimensions in Korea – the Korean War, the Korean Peninsula in Sino-American rivalry, and nuclear weapons – based on legal dimensions of the authority and concrete relevance of specific legal principles. Short-term and long-term solutions tailored to the Korean context will be proposed based on results. Resulting articles will be published to make research accessible to the public and to researchers at various platforms including The National Interest and the Center for International Policy (CIP), and mainstream commentary magazines such as The Atlantic and The New Republic. Any

events related to the program will be compiled with acknowledgment of the KF's support pursuant to Article 9.

(2) Final Report to the KF

The Center will submit a final report (the “**Final Report**”) pursuant to Article 8-B.

- 2-B. The Center will consult with and inform the KF of significant amendments or changes to plans. Any amendment to the Project must be made pursuant to Article 6.

3. Use of the Grant

- 3-A. The Center shall use the Grant exclusively for the Project in accordance with the following budgetary breakdown (in U.S. dollars):

Item	Computation (approximate)	KF	Center	Total
Salaries	Sum of Salaries	24,999	-	24,999
<i>Henri Feron, Project Director</i>	<i>\$39 x 641 hrs</i>	24,999	-	24,999
Conference/event	Sum of Conference/event	1,000	-	1,000
<i>Refreshments</i>	<i>\$500 x 1 time</i>	500	-	500
<i>Conference room rental</i>	<i>\$500 x 1 time</i>	500	-	500
Publications	Sum of Publications	800	-	800
<i>Printing</i>	<i>\$8 x 100 copies</i>	800	-	800
Miscellaneous	Sum of Miscellaneous	500	-	500
<i>Copy editing</i>	<i>\$500</i>	500	-	500
DIRECT COSTS		27,299	-	27,299
INDIRECT COSTS (up to 10% of total direct costs)		2,701	-	2,701
GRAND TOTAL		30,000	-	30,000

- 3-B. The Center shall not reallocate the amount assigned to each budgetary item without the KF's prior written approval. Any reallocation of the Grant should be explained in the financial report and submitted to the KF at the end of the Grant Period.

4. Remittance of the Grant

- 4-A. The KF shall remit the Grant to the following account of the Center by electronic transfer, after both parties have duly signed this Agreement:

Account Name: Center for International Policy



Bank Address: 1218 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036

- [REDACTED]
- 4-B. The Center shall notify the KF within fifteen (15) days of its receipt of the Grant.

5. Management of Expenditure Records

- 5-A. The Center shall maintain, manage, and administer the Grant in an account separate from any and all other Center funds.
- 5-B. The Center agrees to maintain records of all Grant expenditures for five (5) years after the expiration of the Grant Period, so that the KF may refer to them if necessary.

6. Amendments to the Plan/Project

- 6-A. The Center may propose to make a change or an amendment with regard to the Plan or the Project under the condition that the Center promptly notifies the KF.
- 6-B. The Center may amend or change the Plan only upon the KF's prior written approval of the Center's proposal prepared pursuant to Article 6-A. The Center may be required to revise its proposal of the Plan upon the KF's request.
- 6-C. In the event that any change is made to the Plan after the KF's approval, the KF shall not be responsible for the additional expenses incurred as a result of the change. The Center agrees to be solely responsible for any such expenses.
- 6-D. In the event that the Center needs to postpone or cancel the Project, the Center shall promptly notify the KF of the situation and immediately cease to spend any further expenditure. The remaining balance of the Grant shall be returned to the KF within fifteen (15) calendar days from the day on which such discontinuance of spending occurs.

7. Return of the Balance of the Grant

Any balance remaining from the Grant and any Grant funds used for items that are not specified according to Article 3-A shall be returned to the KF within one (1) month of the expiration of the Grant Period unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

8. Obligations of Center

- 8-A. The Center shall inform the KF of the schedule and details of the events related to the Project at least two (2) weeks prior to the date of the respective event.
- 8-B. The Center shall submit to the KF the Final Report on the results of the Project before the expiration of the Grant Period in accordance with Article 1 of this Agreement. The final report, which must be endorsed by the project director (according to the **KF's format**) shall consist of the following:
- ◆ Executive summary of the Final report (in the **KF's format**);
 - ◆ Detailed financial statement endorsed by the director or chief financial officer of the Center (according to the **KF's format**);
 - ◆ Main body of the final report (in the **Center's format**);
 - ◆ Resultant publications;
 - ◆ List of participants; and
 - ◆ Other relevant documents.
- 8-C. In the event that the KF requests copies of the Center's publications regarding the Project for distribution in Korea, the Center shall offer its full cooperation.
- 8-D. If the Center fails to fulfill its obligations under this Agreement in a timely manner, the Center may face consequences from the KF such as cancellation of the Grant or a negative impact on future application(s) for grant support at the KF's discretion.

9. Recognition of Grant Support

The Center agrees to note in all relevant publications and at all meetings for which the Grant funds are used that such publications and meetings have been made possible by the KF's Grant.

10. Termination

- 10-A. The Center acknowledges that the KF may, at its sole discretion, terminate this Agreement by providing written notice to the Center in the event: (i) the Center breaches any material obligation or provision of this Agreement and fails to remedy such breach or (ii) of an occurrence of "force majeure," including any event beyond the Parties' reasonable control, such as war, engagement of hostility, strike, government order, severe economic crisis, or other similar unexpected and/or unforeseen events resulting in the Parties' inability to meet its obligations hereunder.

- 10-B. Notwithstanding other provisions in this Agreement, upon termination of this Agreement pursuant to Article 10-A, the KF shall have the right to request a reimbursement of any remaining balance of the Grant from Center. In such case, the Center shall return to the KF the Grant within fifteen (15) days of receiving the KF's termination notice.
- 10-C. The following Articles will survive termination or expiration of this Agreement: Articles 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11.

11. Dispute Resolution

- 11-A. In case any controversy or claim arises out of or in relation to this Agreement or with respect to a breach hereof, the Parties shall seek to resolve the matter amicably through good faith discussion.
- 11-B. In the event that a dispute cannot be resolved through negotiation, either Party may seek resolution in a court of the country of the Party against which a claim is made. Should legal action be required, this Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the country of the Party against which a claim is made.

This Agreement shall be executed in the English language only, and the English version of the Agreement shall prevail over any translation thereof.

[Signature Page Follows]

The undersigned parties agree to the foregoing terms and conditions:

September 10, 2020

Month, Day, Year



Young-pil Kang
Executive Vice President
The Korea Foundation

September 10, 2020

Month, Day, Year



Salih Booker
President and CEO
Center for International Policy

계획서 Proposal

1. 사업명 Title of the Project

Just Coexistence: Resolving the Korean Security Crisis Through Sovereign Equality

2. 사업요약 Summary of the Project

The failure to resolve the Korean security crisis has left Northeast Asia locked in endless war and the constant risk of a grave nuclear escalation, amid growing Sino-American tensions. Peaceful settlement proposals presented by policymakers, academics and the think-tank community struggle to establish consensus among the parties in conflict, as decades of war and political polarization have made it difficult to discern what should be a just middle ground that respects the core interests of all sides.

To address this gap, I am seeking support from the Korea Foundation to conduct research on a “peace regime” identifying a nonideological middle ground based on legal and realist theory. I would demonstrate, on the one hand, that proposals straying too far from the fundamental legal principle of sovereign equality will be seen as unfair demands of concession. On the other hand, I would show that proposals must address the realist interrelation between three conflicts at the heart of the crisis – the unresolved state of war, Sino-American tensions, and the standoff over North Korea’s nuclear program. Proposals focused on denuclearization generally fall short in both respects, leaving North Korea to prefer pursuing nuclear development and China to materially support its ally.

The recommendations I would make in the proposed project will include steps for the short term, such as a peace agreement, a strengthening of South Korean military sovereignty, and/or an arms control agreement with North Korea. It will also sketch out long term options such as the pursuit of a federal reunification, an agreement aimed at the non-alignment of the Peninsula, and/or security arrangements that manage the reality of North Korean nuclear weapons while safeguarding South Korean security.

I would build on my legal background and the sustained research I have conducted on the resolution of the Korean security crisis. I have developed a rare vantage point through my study of international law in both China and the West, having written my doctoral dissertation on nonideological solutions to disputes on Chinese human rights. I would also draw on the insights of a book I co-edited for the Korean Institute for National Unification while working at the Columbia Law School Center for Korean Legal Studies, in which I authored a chapter on federal reunification and the permanent neutrality of the Korean Peninsula, as well as on the findings of a report I am currently writing on the legal implications of a peace agreement, commissioned by the Korea Peace Now campaign.

The proposed research would contribute to the policy debate on the resolution of the Korean security crisis through diverse formats addressing a variety of audiences. First, I would write a series of six articles in a high-impact foreign publication to which I regularly contribute, *The National Interest*. Second, I would explain the lessons in layman’s terms in two articles for mainstream commentary magazines, such as *The Atlantic*, *The New Republic* or *The American Conservative*. Third, I would develop the research findings into a report with all the technical analysis and references required for a specialized policymaker audience. I would publicize the report through launch events in Washington D.C., at the Center for International Policy, and New York, prospectively at the Korea Society or the Columbia Law School Center for Korean Legal Studies. I would also use the report to inform my advising of international and national groups advocating for peace in Korea.

3. 사업목적, 배경 및 기대효과 Purpose, Background, and Expected Outcomes

The purpose of this research is to help revitalize the stalled policy debate in the United States and South Korea on how to peacefully settle the Korean security crisis, as past approaches appear to have hit an impasse with the failure of “maximum pressure” policies, North Korea’s increasing unresponsiveness to South Korean engagement initiatives, and destabilizing trends in the US-ROK alliance. My research would propose pragmatic arguments and perspectives to overcome the politically polarized deadlock that has developed in the policy debate over the years. I would present a novel combination of legal and realist theory to demonstrate the reasons of this impasse and ways to resolve it, sharing the results with the policy community and the wider public through a series of articles, a policy report, and launch events.

The stakes are well-known. First, the risk of open conflict breaking out, intentionally or accidentally, threatens both Koreas with mutually assured destruction. The U.S. Congressional Research Service cited research estimating that a nuclear escalation could result in “tens of millions of casualties and the destruction of the eleventh largest economy in the world” (R44994, p. 19). Second, there is the risk that the United States and China could get dragged into direct conflict. They faced off once in Korea already, now

have formal alliances with South and North Korea respectively, and are much more heavily armed than in the 1950s. Third, the clock is ticking. The development of the North Korean nuclear program and the rise of China is changing the balance of power faster than can be matched by South Korea and the United States, affecting possible negotiation outcomes.

While there have been repeated calls for a “peace regime” to replace this dangerous status quo, the concerned States have proven unable to find a consensus solution. Part of the problem is that past proposals tend to focus on the nuclear dimension without sufficiently addressing the insecurity wrought by the continuing war and growing Sino-American tensions. The result is that North Korea finds it is safer to keep its nuclear weapons and China to help its ally stomach the pressure.

Approaching the problem from a realist perspective, the challenge is to find an equilibrium that can better secure the national interests and security of each side than the status quo. For the Koreans, the division fuels a constant existential threat, but paradoxically also a guarantee of their continued sovereignty. For the United States and China, the standoff brings burdensome alliance responsibilities, but also roughly “equal” division of influence on the Peninsula. And for North Korea, its nuclear arsenal involves massive sanctions wrought by a disapproving nuclear club, but also a guarantee of security that is hard to match with a simple agreement.

International law provides authoritative guidance on how to reconcile each side’s interests, as its rules by their very nature are supposed to be based on realist consensus. The law is based on the concept of a social contract that persuades sovereign States to sacrifice some of the absolute freedom they would enjoy in a lawless state of nature, and to replace it with an order that better preserves their national interests and security through rules of peaceful coexistence. The problem with North Korea right now is that it is so marginalized from the global order that it has come to live by its own rules, whether that means ignoring Security Council resolutions, or repudiating the Armistice, or disregarding human rights accusations, or recouping sanctions losses with illicit activities. We cannot persuade it to join and durably respect an agreement – or even the rest of international law – without matching the benefits it sees itself as enjoying now. This requires returning to some of the basic legal guarantees that are supposed to come with the international social contract of the UN Charter, but that may have been compromised as the crisis evolved.

I would argue that there are in particular three fundamental principles of international law, all deriving from national sovereignty, without which a peace regime is unlikely come to fruition. The first is the prohibition of the threat or use of force, and the corollary that UN Members must solve disputes peacefully, in good faith, and without endangering international peace and security. This suggests that no side should raise preconditions to ending the Korean War. It is improper and counterproductive to deny peace as leverage for other goals, because it legitimizes the use of force as a bargaining chip, leading to an endless spiral of militarization.

The second is the principle of non-intervention, which according to the International Court of Justice entitles States to freely choose their political, economic, social and cultural system and to freely formulate their foreign policy (*Nicaragua v. USA*, para. 202). This suggests that no side should be forced to change their political system or their alliances, and that the Koreans in particular should be free to pursue reconciliation unfettered by other goals. Diplomacy is permissible, coercion is not.

The third is the right to self-defense, and the corollary according to the Court that any limitations of armaments should be accepted by the State in question (*Nicaragua v. USA*, para. 269). No side should be forced to disarm, lest negotiations be perceived as a demand of surrender. Any disarmament or arms control should be freely consented to, for instance on the basis of reciprocity or other positive incentives. There are legitimate questions about the relationship of self-defense and Security Council resolutions, but adopted resolutions appear to have strayed too far from a balance and as a result are unable to solve the crisis.

Insofar as departing from these three legal principles undermines the chances of a peaceful settlement, they provide us with a baseline to discuss possible ways out of the increasingly dangerous status quo. For the Korean War dimension, they point towards a peace agreement to restore the basic conditions necessary for peaceful relations, opening the possibility of a non-ideological, federal reunification. For Sino-American rivalry, they highlight the importance of strengthening South Korean military and diplomatic sovereignty to insulate the Peninsula from superpower tensions, with the option of a bilateral or quadrilateral agreement for non-alignment or neutrality. Finally, for the nuclear standoff, they suggest a voluntary arms control agreement to manage the reality of North Korean nuclear weapons, with a choice on the long-term to either resolve the issue through reunification, or to have North Korea persuaded enough of the benefits of denuclearization, or to let South Korea mirror the North Korean arsenal – though there would be practical limits to that latter option given the South’s dependence on uranium imports.

The aim is that the recognition of those options and legal principles would jolt the discourse on how to resolve the Korean security crisis away from entrenched political polarization and into a more pragmatic direction. Of course, respect for fundamental principles of international law is often distorted in practice by imbalances of power, and the United States is an extremely powerful actor with many constituencies opposed to changing the long-standing focus on a quasi-unilateral denuclearization. Reiterating the legal

principles that should be the baseline in international relations nevertheless reminds us of the limits of power, helping us understand the crisis and developed principled solutions that safeguard the core interests of all. As the North Korean nuclear program grows and as China rises, the opportunity costs of overestimating U.S. bargaining power in this crisis become more and more evident, and there will be greater openness to approaches more in line with legal principles designed for just and peaceful coexistence. I hope that my research would thereby contribute to find principled solutions improving U.S. and South Korean security relative to the deteriorating status quo.

Beyond the policy community, the research would also inform my advising of international and national groups advocating for peace in Korea. This includes in particular the Korea Peace Now campaign, composed of the Nobel Women's Initiative, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Korean Women's Movement for Peace and WomenCrossDMZ, as well as the U.S.-based Korea Peace Network. The research would help amplify this advocacy by providing it with a more robust theoretical framework focusing on a balancing of the interests of all parties. The close working relationship with these groups has allowed me in the past to achieve high-impact results, for instance in (1) informing the drafting of the Congressional resolution H. Res. 152 on a formal end to the Korean War, (2) informing the writing of a letter on the right to peace to the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DPRK, who has then highlighted this right in his latest report to the Human Rights Council, as well as (3) a report they commissioned me to edit on the human impact of sanctions against North Korea, which was widely cited in the media (WSJ, VOA, USA Today, etc.) and saw its core argument reflected in the latest report of the UN Panel of Experts monitoring North Korea sanctions.

4. 연구내용 Description of Research Activities

The research would be conducted principally from the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C., with consultations of, among others, Harry Kazianis, Senior Director for the Center for the National Interest; Jeong-ho Roh, Director of the Columbia Law School Center for Korean Legal Studies in New York, NY; Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute; Jessica Lee, Senior Research Fellow on East Asia at the Quincy Institute; Christine Ahn, Co-coordinator of the Korea Peace Now Campaign; and Adam Mount, Senior Fellow at the Federation of American Scientists. I also plan to consult experts in South Korea – remotely, given the uncertainty surrounding the coronavirus crisis – including Moon Chung-in, Special Advisor to ROK President Moon Jae-in for Foreign Affairs and National Security; Park Young-ho of the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU); as well as Suh Bo-hyuk and Chun Chaesung of Seoul National University.

Following the methodology described below, planned legal research would generally cover the philosophy of international law (foundation of the law in social contract theory), the law of war and on the use of force (peace and armistice agreements, neutrality, self-defense), national sovereignty (non-interference, relation to the UN Charter), nonproliferation law (nonproliferation treaties, Security Council resolutions), and to a certain extent on constitutional law (binding nature of inter-Korean agreements).

Research on the theory of international relations would cover in particular realist grand strategy and its applications to Northeast Asia, balance of power theory, as well as nuclear deterrence theory. There would also be more localized research on the history of the Korean security crisis (Korean War, nuclear talks), on the US-ROK alliance (troop presence, operational control, United Nations Command), and on Sino-American relations in the context of the Korean Peninsula.

5. 관련 기존연구 Related Existing Research/Literature Review

Proposals on how to resolve the Korean security crisis tend to be very focused on the nuclear dimension. A coercively-oriented report by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies calls for a whole-of-government effort to impose more pressure on North Korea and on China, which risks fanning the flames of conflict ("Maximum Pressure 2.0: A Plan for North Korea," 2019). A more cooperatively-oriented proposal by the US Institute of Peace calls more flexibly to "prioritize peace with denuclearization," but focuses its research much more on process (incrementalism) than on concrete proposals for the substance of agreements ("A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula," 2020). A report by the Federation of American Scientists focused on highlighting the opportunity cost of unsuccessfully seeking denuclearization in the short term, emphasizing instead the need for interim agreements on arms control and confidence-building (Report of the International Study Group on North Korea Policy, 2019). Perhaps the most ambitious and holistic plan is by Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Moon Chung-in, Thomas Pickering and Leon Sigal ("Ending the North Korean Nuclear Threat By a Comprehensive Security Settlement in Northeast Asia," 2017). It proposes a phased process involving first a freeze-for-freeze, second a dismantling of nuclear material production facilities with incremental sanctions relief and the creation of a regional security council, and third a surrender of nuclear weapons with a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula and a peace agreement.

However, the chances of successfully implementing these proposals are undermined by the national security risks that the continued state of war and rising Sino-American rivalry create for North Korea and China. If they address ending the Korean War, it is only at the end of the process, and there is limited consideration on securing the process against growing Sino-American rivalry. The problem is that North Korea considers it safer to maintain nuclear weapons and is autarkic enough to sustain pressure, with China willing to fill the gaps. For a peaceful settlement of the security crisis to succeed, we must find an equilibrium that fulfills the core interests of all parties.

A consideration of American grand strategy may allow us to identify where those interests may intersect. There is an increasing trend among realist scholars, such as Barry Posen, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer, to question the wisdom of massive U.S. engagement abroad and advocate for local States to drive the resolution of local problems (Barry Posen, “Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy”; Stephen M. Walt, “The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy”; Stephen M. Walt and John Mearsheimer, “The Case for Offshore Balancing”). This trend arises out of the concern that the pursuit of a global “liberal hegemony” is too far removed from America’s interests and capabilities.

In the context of Northeast Asia, the key question that emerges in the realist debate on American grand strategy is the extent to which the United States should or should not actively contain China. Several realists have warned that China’s rise implies increasing potential for conflict, such as Graham Allison based on his “Thucydides trap” theory (Allison, “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap”). Yet opinions diverge on the consequences that a U.S. withdrawal from the region would have. Kenneth Waltz’ structural realism suggests that the region would eventually tend to a balance of power, while John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism warns instead that China would tend towards seeking hegemony (Waltz, “Theory of International Politics”; Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”). This yields different conclusions about what U.S. policy should be. Posen contends that the United States can’t stop China’s rise and that it should eventually withdraw from Korea, cognizant that this may mean South Korea developing nuclear weapons. Walt and Mearsheimer, by contrast, have argued that the resources saved through restraint should be focused on preventing Chinese hegemony in Northeast Asia, a region they consider highly strategic (“offshore balancing”).

Where American realists tend to agree, however, is that North Korea’s nuclear program is a sideshow compared to the dilemma raised by the rise of China. Posen today laments the fixation of U.S. grand strategy on global nonproliferation, arguing that America’s nuclear priorities should be more modestly to deter attacks on the U.S. homeland. Waltz, and to a certain extent Mearsheimer, famously argued that the spread of nuclear weapons could be even beneficial for peace and stability in certain cases (Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better”; Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent”). Also relevant is research by Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann suggesting that, contrary to popular belief, nuclear weapons are not suited to blackmail (Sechser and Fuhrmann, “Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy”).

This review of the realist debate on American grand strategy suggests that there is possible intersection between North Korean, Chinese, and US national security interests in a peace regime that manages the Sino-American rivalry without necessarily implying the elusive goal of North Korean denuclearization. The question that then arises is how to ensure South Korean national security. A key question is to what extent the United States would be committed to risk nuclear attacks on American cities to protect South Korean ones. One controversial possibility is letting South Korea develop a nuclear arsenal that mirrors that of the North, an option Charles Ferguson has warned against, but that as Lim Eunjung notes has a certain popularity in South Korea (Ferguson, “How South Korea Could Acquire and Deploy Nuclear Weapons”; Lim, “South Korea’s Nuclear Dilemmas”). Another is to explore scenarios of reunification that eliminate the main risk of conflict without undue risk for South Korea in the interim or in a future where China continues to rise.

The concept of permanent neutrality may be an element of reunification scenarios, to insulate the Korean Peninsula from the instability that may be caused by the development of Sino-American rivalry. Some authors such as Kwak Tae-hwan and Joo Seung-ho have explored neutrality and Jin Sang-pil notes a sustained international debate on Korean neutrality at the turn of the 20th century (Kwak and Jo, “The Future of the Korean Peninsula: Unification and Security Options for the 21st Century, Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, no. 2; Jin, “Surviving Imperial Intrigues: Korea’s Struggle for Neutrality Amid Empires, 1882-1907”).

Wherever the political decisions fall on how to assure South Korean security, there is a clear need for legal research on other elements of a peace regime for it to be equitable and acceptable to all sides. Perhaps the clearest measure of equity in that context is international law, given its base in social contract theory (Hugo Grotius, “De Jure Belli ac Pacis”) and its modern twist on the outlawing of war (Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, “The Internationalists: And Their Plan to Outlaw War”). This research would nevertheless be based principally on legal primary sources. Some of the seminal cases to discuss are the *Lotus* case (for the social contract basis of the law), the *Nicaragua v. USA* ruling (on self-defense and non-intervention in internal affairs), and the *Legality of the Threat or Use*

of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion (on nonproliferation).

6. 연구방법 Research Methods and Approaches

The research would rely on realist and legal methodology to identify elements of settlement that are not moored in either liberal or communist ideology, given the sensitivity of this divide in a region still split along Cold War lines. It would proceed methodically through each identified dimension of the Korean security crisis: Korean War, Sino-American rivalry, and nuclear standoff. The research would demonstrate the origins of the status quo in adversarial approaches to each dimension of the Korean security crisis, before elaborating a short-term cooperative solution and finally sketching a possible long term solution. It would thereby identify a broad range of elements to a possible settlement of the crisis, which may or not be applied based on political preference.

Realist methodology implies the assumption that States act so as to maximize their self-interest (and are rational enough to see how particular agreements may further those interests better than if they didn't compromise). This allows identifying a range of pragmatic models that may be acceptable to parties to the Korean security crisis. Realism is particularly useful when discussing negotiations and settlements, as negotiation theory itself tends to be heavily based on the rational interests of the parties. Use of realist methodology also avoids the teleological bent of liberal theories of international law, which may lead to settlement models unacceptable to formally communist countries such as North Korea and China, for instance in terms of human rights.

Legal methodology implies here that the reasoning and identified solutions should be reconcilable with international law, in particular with basic principles of sovereignty. While interpretations of the law may diverge, the reasoning must remain coherently argued on the basis of recognized sources of international law, as laid out in art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (treaties, international custom, general principles of international law, judicial decisions and "the teaching of the most qualified publicists"). This methodology has several advantages: a settlement must conform to the law to be binding, the law avoids accusations of ideology, and it is theoretically based on the self-interest of States.

7. 연구일정 Research Project Timeline

The research project begins on October 1, 2020, the official start date of my new contract as Senior Fellow with the Center for International Policy. I plan to conduct my trip to Korea at the beginning of the project, in November, to gather research material through interviews and consultations.

From October 2020 to March 2021, I would write every month an article for *The National Interest* as part of a six-part series exploring either short-term and long-term option for each of the three dimensions of the Korean security crisis, as described below in box 9.

Over the course of April and May, I would write two articles from a mainstream commentary magazine, explaining layman's terms the dilemmas raised by the relationship between the Korean War and the nuclear standoff, and on the risk of growing Sino-American tensions for the Korean Peninsula.

I would then from June to September write and publish a report developing the research findings into a holistic approach. I would publicize the report through launch events in September.

8. 연구결과 Expected Results (Outcomes) of Project

The project would propose several elements for resolution of realist dilemmas in each dimension of the Korean security crisis, which can be mixed and matched based on political preference and risk tradeoffs, while remaining mindful of the close interrelationship of the conflicts.

For the Korean War dimension, the key dilemma is to what extent maintaining or ending the state of war serves everybody's interests. The argument here would be that artificial maintenance of the war leaves everybody worse off by heightening national security risks and is hard to reconcile with the prohibition of the threat of force in international relations. The project would propose a peace agreement as a short-term solution, explaining that contrary to common assumptions it does not legally undermine the US-ROK alliance or the positions of the parties in the nuclear standoff. It sketches out the long-term possibility of a federal reunification that preserves the ideological preferences of the South and North, suggesting legal mechanisms to safely develop increasing common ground.

For the Sino-American rivalry dimension, the key dilemma is to what extent maintaining or ending the Cold War alliances configuration (US-South Korea and China-North Korea) serves everybody's interests. The argument here would be that this configuration makes Korea one of the most likely theaters of rising Sino-American tensions, raising the stakes for all and particularly South Korea given its dual dependence – military on the United States and economic on China. The project would propose on the short term a strengthening of South Korean military sovereignty accompanied by an increased responsibility for its own defense and diplomacy, to insulate it from bloc dynamics that led for instance to the THAAD dispute. For the long term, the project would suggest a model of armed permanent neutrality to maximize sovereignty and insulation, whether for the two Koreas separately or in a context of reunification. This would arguably transform the Peninsula from a source of instability into one of stability, as Koreans both South and North would have a much stronger incentive to avoid getting involved in the escalation of Sino-American tensions.

For the nuclear dimension, the key dilemma is to what extent maintaining or ending the focus on North Korean denuclearization serves everybody's interests. The argument here would be that focusing on this increasingly elusive goal is holding up progress on other important goals of national interest and security, and that the failure of the Security Council to stop North Korean nuclear weapons development is undermining its authority and credibility, with potentially wide-reaching consequences for the world at large. The project would propose in the short term an arms control agreement to freeze and control the program at its current levels. I would propose for the long term either to address the imbalance through reunification while South Korea is still under U.S. nuclear umbrella or to build enough confidence and respect of sovereignty for North Korea to denuclearize in the long term. A South Korean nuclear weapons program would require leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and could pose considerable risks in for its nuclear energy industry, given its dependence on uranium imports. It is therefore an option heavily dependent on U.S. approval.

In conclusion, the project would propose short term options that could include a peace agreement, strengthened South Korean sovereignty and responsibility for its defense, and/or an arms control agreement with North Korea. Long term options would include a federal reunification, armed permanent neutrality, and/or geographically limited tolerance of nuclear weapons.

9. 연구 결과 활용 방안 Plan for the Use of Project Results (i.e. publication, event etc.)

My plan is to make the research accessible in diverse formats to a variety of audiences. I would disseminate the research results first through a series of articles in The National Interest, a freely accessible publication with a wide readership that is focused on foreign policy from a realist perspective. I have published regularly with them and my writings there have been cited internationally, from MBC News to Le Monde. The series would include six articles, each addressing either a short-term or a long-term option for one of the three conflict dimensions I have outlined. Concretely speaking, this would mean articles discussing: (1) a peace agreement to end the Korean War, (2) a federal reunification to durably resorb military tensions, (3) a strengthening of South Korean sovereignty through OPCON transfer and self-reliant military capabilities, (4) an agreement for the non-alignment or neutrality of the Peninsula, (5) an arms control agreement with North Korea, and (6) options for managing on the long-term the reality of North Korean nuclear weapons without compromising South Korean security.

I would also disseminate the research to a wider public with two articles in mainstream commentary magazines such as The Atlantic, The New Republic, or The American Conservative. One of those would discuss the relationship between the Korean War and the nuclear standoff, while the other the future of the Korean Peninsula amid Sino-American rivalry. They would explain in layman's terms why we should be prepared for change in the increasingly unstable Cold War order in Northeast Asia and introduce the solutions I propose.

Further, I would produce a report developing the research results into a comprehensive approach to establishing a peace regime. It would include the technical analysis and footnoted references necessary for a policymaking or academic audience, based on the model of the report Korea Peace Now commissioned me to edit last year, "The Human Costs and Gendered Impact of Sanctions on North Korea" (43 pages, 169 footnotes). The report would be published by the Center for International Policy and would be promoted in launch events in Washington, D.C., at the Center, and in New York, with either the Columbia Law School Center for Korean Legal Studies or the Korea Society, with which I have preexisting relationships. I would also work with the Korea Peace Now campaign to publicize the report in and through its advocacy networks, to help educate on how to arrive to a peace regime that respects the core interests of all parties.

10. 연구 참여자 List of Research Participants

번호 Number	성명 Name	현직(소속 및 직책) Current Position (Institution & Title)	이력사항 Career	참가역할 Participant's Role
1	Henri Feron	Center for International Policy, Senior Fellow	(see attached CV)	Principal Investigator

11. 재단 지원 종료 후 계획 Plans after Conclusion of the Foundation's Grant Support

I will after the conclusion of this grant continue to work as a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy, having been appointed to this position for two years (October 2020 to October 2022). The area of focus of my appointment is East Asia and International Law, and given the urgency of the Korean security crisis I will continue to prioritize policy work related to its peaceful settlement. I will also continue to advise advocacy groups lobbying for peace in Korea, a cause I deeply care about personally. The Korea Peace Now campaign has been the main source of funding for my research since I finished my appointment at Columbia Law School and I intend to continue working with them as it is a cause I care about personally and on which our collaboration has been particularly fruitful. In future years, I hope to continue policy-based work on the Peninsula, examining more closely the interrelationship of the Korean security crisis and growing Sino-American tensions.

In terms of concrete research, I plan from October 2021 to 2022 to write a book synthesizing the research I will have done over the years on the resolution of the Korean security crisis, including the report on the impact of sanctions I edited last year, the report I am editing this year on the legal implications of a peace agreement, and the report I am proposing for next year, through the present application, on a longer-term peace regime. All these elements of research would allow me to write a comprehensive, peace-oriented book covering first the failure and human costs of pressure-based policies, second the argument that a peace agreement with North Korea is the single-most effective policy step we have available for improving U.S. and South Korean security, and third a sketch of the long term peace regime with the best chances of durably restoring international peace and security in the region.

12. 타 기관 지원신청 현황 Status of Applications for Other Grants

※ 재단에 지원을 요청하는 사업과 유사/동일한 사업 및 현재 추진 예정 사업에 대해 여타 국내외 기관에 지원 신청을 한 경우 신청 내역을 간략히 작성하시기 바랍니다.

If this application is also being reviewed by other grant-making institutions for possible funding support, please provide us with a summary of the applications for other grants to be provided by institutions in Korea or outside Korea.

수혜기간 Grant Period: From-To	수혜종류 Title of Grant	금액 Amount (of Support Funds)	수혜기관 Sponsorship Organization	지원여부 확정시기 Announcement Date of Application Results
N/A				

13. KF 사업 신청 현황 Status of Applications for Other KF Projects

※ 해외정책연구지원 외 재단의 2019년도 사업에 신청한 경우 신청 내역을 간략히 작성하시기 바랍니다.

If the project director or participants are also applying for other KF Grant or projects, please provide us with a summary of those applications.

수혜기간 Project/Grant Period: From-To	사업명 Title of KF Project	금액 Amount (of Support Funds)
N/A		